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Coronavirus and fraud in the UK: from the responsibilisation of the civil 
society to the deresponsibilisation of the state 
Dr Lorenzo Pasculli* 
Introduction 
England, summer 2020 – in the middle of the coronavirus pandemic. In Camden, London, 
Mohammed – a 20-year old student – is sending texts messages. More than a thousand text 
messages. One reads: ‘UKGOV: You are eligible for a Tax Refund as a result of the COVID-
19 pandemic.  Please fill out the following form so that we can process your refund.’ Another 
reads: ‘Due to the current pandemic we are issuing a refund for your last bill. Please verify 
your details so we can process your refund.’ The plan is to use the personal details of the 
recipients to steal their money. The scheme will claim almost fifty victims and cause them a 
loss of more than £10,000.1 At the same time, in Solihull, a seasoned businessman – he’s 57 – 
shuts his laptop, a troubled expression on his face. We’ll call him George – although his identity 
hasn’t been revealed. George has just submitted a fraudulent claim within Coronavirus Job 
Retention Scheme (CJRS) that might result in a colossal loss (£495,000) for the UK 
Government.2 (Later, the authorities will suspect his involvement in multi-million-pound tax 
fraud and money laundering).3 Back in London, Jim Winters, Head of Fraud at Barclays, 
scratches his head as he reads the latest findings from his team, who flags a 66 per cent increase 
in reported scams in the first six months of 2020 compared with the last six months of 2019, 
with a 60 per cent increase in fraud volumes only between May and July, as certain lockdown 
measures were relaxed and customers became more willing to spend4.  
Meanwhile, from dozens living rooms and bedrooms across the United Kingdom (UK), comes 
the muffled tapping sound of frantic typing, as Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
staff working from home strive to keep pace with the flood of reports coming through the 
HMRC Fraud Hotline5. In just about two months, from the launch of the CJRS in April, up 
until the end of June, the HMRC will receive more than 4,400 reports of suspected fraud linked 
to the scheme,6 The same tapping can be heard in the homes of many Action Fraud employees, 
as they address the 2,866 reports on COVID-19 related fraud received in only a month (from 
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1 Crown Prosecution Service ‘CPS Warns - Don't Get Caught by COVID Fraud’ (CPS 17 July 2020) < 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/london-south/news/warns-dont-get-caught-covid-fraud > accessed 5 December 2020. 
2 Emma Agyemang, ‘Businessman Arrested Over Job Retention Scheme Fraud’ Financial Times (London, 9 July 
2020) < https://www.ft.com/content/45a00e4f-c716-458f-9b92-126695fdb088 > accessed 5 December 2020. 
3 Joanna Partridge ‘Man Arrested in Solihull Over Suspected £500k Furlough Fraud’ The Guardian (London, 9 
July 2020) < https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jul/09/man-arrested-in-solihull-on-suspected-half-
million-pound-furlough > accessed 5 December 2020. 
4 Matthew Vincent ‘UK Financial Scams Surge During Coronavirus Lockdown’ Financial Times (London, 19 
August 2020) < https://www.ft.com/content/fcce8128-4cf8-428b-ac28-3e9d90f66c96 > accessed 5 December 
2020. 
5 HMRC ‘HMRC Fraud Hotline – Information report’ (gov.uk 2020) < 
https://www.tax.service.gov.uk/shortforms/form/TEH_IRF > accessed 4 December 2020. 
6 Partridge (n 3). 
7 June 2020 to 7 July 2020), with a total loss of £11,316,266 has been reported lost by victims 
of coronavirus-related scams.7   
Punctual as a Swiss clock, a predicted8 fraud upsurge has hit pandemic-stricken Britain. The 
sudden move of our lives online paved the way to new opportunities for fraud. The personal 
and economic harms are enormous9. The UK is responding with a two-fold approach mirroring 
the overall response to economic crime and a more general trend in crime control. On the one 
hand, the Government still relies on traditional law enforcement. On the other hand, it seeks to 
encourage individuals, businesses and public agencies to take responsibility in controlling and 
preventing crime by changing their practices,10 a strategy known as ‘responsibilisation’.11 
Examples of this are information campaigns, compliance models, due diligence and risk 
assessment and management. With the many limitations placed by the pandemic on law 
enforcement, including the closure of many courts and reduced police and prosecution 
capabilities, much emphasis has been placed on these strategies. But do they work?  
While literature in the last few decades has broadly analysed the social implications of 
responsibilisation on crime control in general, not many studies have focused on the specific 
area of financial crime.12 There’s an even more urgent need to assess responsibilisation 
strategies with specific regard to fraud in the context and the coronavirus pandemic. The 
purpose of this study is to assess the UK response to Covid19-related fraud risks in light of the 
literature on responsibilisation. We will do so through a comparative review of different 
policies and practices by various government agencies. The social and policy implications of 
such an analysis can be many. On the short term, it could be helpful to improve Covid19-related 
anti-fraud policies and practices. On a longer term and a broader level, it could help improve, 
on the one hand, the overall response of the UK to fraud and financial crime and, on the other 
hand, the future responses to such crime in the context of pandemics and other disasters. 
Moreover, given that responsibilisation strategies are not exclusive to the UK, hopefully, this 
paper can provide valuable insights for other jurisdictions. In the first part of our study, we will 
present our methodology. In the second part, we will present a critical analysis of the literature 
on responsibilisation. In the third part, we will provide a short overview of the Government 
response to fraud risks during the coronavirus pandemic. In the third part, we will critically 
 
7 Action Fraud ‘Victims of Coronavirus-Related Scams Have Lost Over £11 Million’ (actionfraud.police.uk 8 
July, 2020’) < https://www.actionfraud.police.uk/covid19 > accessed 4 December 2020. 
8 National Crime Agency (NCA) ‘Beware Fraud and Scams During Covid-19 Pandemic Fraud’ 
(nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk 26 March 2020) < https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/fraud-scams-covid19 > 
accessed 4 December 2020; Michael D’Ambrosio and Terry Wade, ‘There’s Another Coronavirus Crisis Brewing: 
Fraud’ (The Washington Post, 14 April 2020) < https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/theres-
another-coronavirus-crisis-brewing-fraud/ > accessed 4 December 2020. 
9 cf Richard Walton, Sophia Falkner and Benjamin Barnard Daylight Robbery. Uncovering the True Cost of Public 
Sector Fraud in the Age of COVID-19 (Policy Exchange 2020) < https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Daylight-Robbery.pdf > accessed 4 December 2020. 
10 Adam Crawford ‘Networked Governance and the Post-regulatory State? Steering, Rowing and Anchoring the 
Provision of Policing and Security’ (2006) 10 Theoretical Criminology 449. 
11 David Garland ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society’ (1996) 
36 The British Journal of Criminology 445, 452-455 and David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and 
Social Order in Contemporary Society (University of Chicago Press 2001). 
12 See, for instance, Shahrzad Fouladvand ‘Corruption, Regulation and the Law: The Power not to Prosecute under 
the UK Bribery Act 2010’ in Nicholas Ryder and Lorenzo Pasculli, Corruption, Integrity and the Law: Global 
Regulatory Challenges (Routledge 2020) 71 and Lorenzo Pasculli and Nicholas Ryder ‘The global anti-corruption 
framework: Lights, shadows and prospects’ in Nicholas Ryder and Lorenzo Pasculli (eds) Corruption, Integrity 
and the Law: Global Regulatory Challenges (Routledge 2020), 3-13. 
 
assess both the practical and the deeper societal implications of such a response. In the fifth 
part, we will propose some recommendations for reform. We will then draw our conclusion. 
Methodology 
This review is based on a comparative analysis of a selected number of policy instruments in 
the UK as reported in many secondary sources in a multidisciplinary perspective. Why a 
comparative review? A first glance at these instruments reveals a degree of 
compartmentalisation. Different government bodies offer different tools and advice related to 
their specific territorial jurisdiction or subject-related remit – for instance, local governments 
inevitably focus on local risks, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) focuses on cyber-
fraud, while the COVID-19 Counter Fraud Response Team (CCFRT) focuses on policy-related 
fraud risks. A certain level of compartmentalisation is expected in the complexity of 
contemporary socio-economic life, but it this might also hinder the understanding of broader 
developments in fraud (and crime) control at a national level and their social implications. A 
comparative review supported by a literature review should help paint such a broader picture 
and assess its impact on society.  
Our review relies on research conducted for two inquiries of the House of Commons Treasury 
Committee respectively on the economic impact of coronavirus in June 2020,13 and economic 
crime in November 2020.14 We relied on secondary sources only. To ensure the highest 
reliability we have considered only official data, reports, policy documents and online materials 
from the national Government and local authorities. We started from the general website of the 
UK Government (gov.uk), which also incorporates sources from specific agencies, such as 
HMRC, and then we have examined sources from agencies and regulators that have primary 
institutional responsibility for the response to fraud, such as Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the 
National Crime Agency (NCA), the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA), Action Fraud, and Take Five, the NCSC, and other agencies that might be 
less directed involved in the prevention of fraud, especially during the pandemic, such as the 
National Health Service (NHS), National Trading Standards (NTS) and The Pensions 
Regulator. Finally, we have scanned the official webpages of a sample of different county 
councils. Our analysis did not include sources at city council level.  
A multidisciplinary literature review, illustrated in the next paragraph, will support our 
analysis. Since the pandemic is a recent phenomenon, there are not many academic papers 
directly assessing the sources we will analyse – which is why we hope our analysis might be 
helpful. Nevertheless, general sociological, criminological and legal literature on crime control 
and the causes and responses to fraud and financial crime can be of great help in guiding our 
assessment. 
This study has some limitations. Firstly, it only covers secondary sources. Research on primary 
data would be required to test our findings. Secondly, the Government’s response to any issue 
related by the pandemic is constantly evolving at a rather speedy pace. The bulk of our analysis 
was conducted in June 2020. We have tried to update it to more recent developments until the 
time of our submission (December 2020). But we expect further changes may take place by 
the time of publication. Nevertheless, we believe our analysis will maintain its usefulness, 
 
13 Treasury Committee ‘Economic impact of coronavirus’ (parliament.uk 2020) < 
https://committees.parliament.uk/work/224/economic-impact-of-coronavirus/ > accessed 5 December 2020; 
Lorenzo Pasculli ‘Written evidence submitted by Dr Lorenzo Pasculli’ EIC0792 (23 June 2020) < 
https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/7740/html/ > accessed 5 December 2020. 
14 Treasury Committee ‘Economic crime’ (parliament.uk 2020) <  
https://committees.parliament.uk/work/726/economic-crime/ > accessed 5 December 2020; Lorenzo Pasculli 
‘Written evidence submitted by Dr Lorenzo Pasculli’ (27 November 2020), unpublished yet. 
especially in assessing policies and practices that are not exclusively related to the pandemic 
but reflect more general contemporary developments in the control of fraud and financial 
crime. 
Responsibilisation and its discontents 
The UK response to fraud is part of the more general response to economic crime.15 The latter 
can be summarised into two main strategies: law enforcement and ‘responsibilisation’. Law 
enforcement encompasses prevention, investigation and prosecution of economic crime by 
state agencies, such as the SFO, the CPS and the judiciary. Responsibilisation seeks to 
compensate for the failure of the state to effectively control increasingly pervasive and volatile 
forms of criminality by devolving crime control responsibilities to individuals and private 
organisations.16 The failure of traditional state-centred strategies is particularly evident in the 
field of financial crime and fraud, especially in their cyber manifestations, which are deeply 
affected by the profound economic and societal changes brought about by the globalisation17. 
Policing financial crimes presents special problems because of the social status of some 
suspects and the relative inaccessibility of most offences to routine observation and traditional 
police methods.18 
Responsibilisation strategies are not limited to financial crime. They are the result of a deeper 
and complex process of adaptation of crime control to new social conditions.19 This process 
has seen the emergence of ‘new modes of governing crime’.20 Programmes of offender 
rehabilitation are abandoned in favour of new programmes of actions directed not towards 
individual offenders, but towards the conduct of potential victims, to vulnerable situations, and 
to ‘those routines of everyday life which create criminal opportunities as unintended by-
product’.21 The primary actor in the ‘business of crime control’ is no longer the state, but non-
state agencies or organisations, to which the state delegates the competence of reducing 
criminal opportunities.22 The state retains its ‘steering’ role – that is, policy decision-making – 
while ‘rowing’ – that is, service delivery23 – is increasingly delegated to the civil society. This 
is part of a broader shift in state governance towards what Braithwaite calls the ‘New 
Regulatory State’, emerged with the Thatcher-Major and Bush-Reagan governments.24 This 
shift has been also captured by Foucault’s governmentality theory, which highlighted the 
dispersal of surveillance and discipline through a multiplicity of controls and the active 
involvement of citizens in the governance of their own conduct.25  
 
15 See HM Treasury and Home Office Economic Crime Plan 2019-2022 (gov.uk 2019) < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/economic-crime-plan-2019-to-2022/economic-crime-plan-2019-
to-2022-accessible-version > accessed 3 December 2020. 
16 cf Garland (n 11).  
17 cf Fouladvand (n 12), Pasculli and Ryder (n 12) and Lorenzo Pasculli ‘The Global Causes of Cybercrime and 
State Responsibilities. Towards an Integrated Interdisciplinary Theory’ (2020) 2(1) Journal of Ethics and Legal 
Technologies 48-74 < https://jelt.padovauniversitypress.it/system/files/papers/JELT-02-01-03.pdf > accessed 3 
December 2020. 
18 M. Levi ‘Policing financial crimes’ in Henry N. Pontell, and Gilbert L. Geis (eds) International Handbook of 
White-Collar and Corporate Crime (Springer 2006) 588-606. 
19 Garland (n 11). 
20 ibid 450. 
21 ibid 451. 
22 ibid 452. 
23 On ‘steering’ and ‘rowing’ see David Osborne and Ted Gaebler Reinventing Government (Penguin 1992). 
24 John Braithwaite ‘The new regulatory state and the transformation of criminology’ (2000) 40(2) British Journal 
of Criminology 222-238. 
25 Michel Foucault Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (Allen Lane 1977) and Michel Foucault ‘The 
subject and power’ (1982) 8(4) Critical Inquiry 777-795. 
Responsibilisation relies on different techniques. For the purposes of this paper, we can group 
these into two main categories: on the one hand, public information campaigns to alert 
individuals and organisations of fraud risks and encourage them to adopt all the necessary 
precautions; on the other hand, the imposition of duties on private organisations, public bodies 
and certain individuals, such as company executives, leaders and professionals, for the 
adoption of specific measures to prevent and counter financial crime and fraud. The 
implementation of such measures is supervised by both non-governmental self-regulatory 
organisations, such as professional associations, and governmental regulators, such as the FCA 
in the UK. The privatisation of crime control responsibilities is accompanied by a managerialist 
and business-like approach in criminal justice26. Moreover, since the focus is on the removal 
of crime opportunities, risk control plays a major role in responsibilisation27. Indeed, many 
techniques aim at the prompt identification of crime risks and their effective assessment and 
mitigation. It must be clear, however, that these new adaptations in crime control have not led 
to dismiss traditional state law enforcement. In a somehow contradictory fashion, the state is 
not always willing to admit its failures and engage in forms of ‘denial’ which brings it to 
reassert its punitive power through ‘law and order’ ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric and policies28. 
However, scholars report an increasing shift in the enforcement of criminal law towards non-
police agencies, such as financial regulators.29 
The Economic Crime Plan 2019-2020 developed by the Home Office and the Treasury30 is an 
excellent example of this dichotomy. According to the Plan, the Government’s response to 
economic crime involves many diverse private sector organisations and collaborative private-
public partnerships.31 Key stakeholders include banking, finance, accountancy, legal and real 
estate firms with obligations under the Money Laundering Regulations 201732. Public-private 
partnerships are a recurring component of each strategic priority outlined in the plan. Reflecting 
the prominence of a risk-based approach typical of responsibilisation, two of these strategic 
priorities are dedicated to risk assessment and management, both at a national level and in the 
private sector: Strategic Priority One seeks to expand the national risk assessments (NRAs) of 
money laundering and terrorist financing to include a wider range of economic crimes and 
develop further public-private partnerships to undertake joint and collective threat assessments 
on economic crime;33 Strategic Priority Five seeks to enhance the management of economic 
crime risk in the private sector34.  
The second strategic priority seeks to improve information-sharing between the public and 
private sectors as a means to enhance both risk/threat analysis and law enforcement.35 Other 
strategic priorities aim at enhancing powers, procedures, tools and capabilities not only of law 
enforcement and the justice system but also of the private sector. Public and private sectors are 
thus forever married in the control of financial crime: ‘Historically, these capabilities have been 
viewed as separate, with insufficient consideration of how they can be combined and used 
 
26 Garland (n 11) 455-456; Ronen Shamir ‘The age of responsibilization: on market-embedded morality’ (2008) 
37(1) Economy and Society 1-19. 
27 Tim Goddard, ‘Post-welfarist risk managers? Risk, Crime Prevention and the Responsibilization of 
Community-based Organizations’ [2012] Theoretical Criminology 1; Pat O’Malley ‘Risk, power and crime 
prevention’ (1992) 21(3) Economy and Society 251-268; Pat O’Malley Crime and Risk (Sage 2010). 
28 cf Garland (n 11) 459-461. 
29 Fouladvand (n 12) 71. 
30 HM Treasury and Home Office (n 15). 
31 ibid. paras 1.30-1.31. 
32 Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017. 
33 HM Treasury and Home Office (n 15) paras 2.5-2.6. 
34 Ibid. paras 6.1-6.26. 
35 ibid. paras 3.1. 
collectively. We think there is substantial scope to enhance the public-private partnership 
around how our collective capabilities can be used. For example, the investigation of fraud is 
a specialist skill, and consequently lends itself to skill transfer or exchange between public and 
private sectors, where both sectors can learn from each other.’36 The international strategy 
outlined in the seventh chapter of the Plan is also focused mostly on ‘understanding the threat’ 
(information-sharing and risk assessment) and strengthening transnational law enforcement 
capabilities.  
These developments raise many concerns. A major one is that it might lead the state to neglect 
(or forget) its responsibilities for the removal of those societal conditions that foster criminality 
through welfare interventions.37 The almost obsessive emphasis on micro-management of risks 
and situations implies a considerable diversion of focus and resources from broader social 
policies aimed at removing the root causes of criminality. A previous interdisciplinary 
literature review suggests that a distinction can be drawn between proximate causes and remote 
causes of crime (these are ideal types: in reality the boundaries between them are nuanced).38 
Proximate causes are individual and situational factors that can encourage or facilitate criminal 
behaviour. These include motivations, opportunities and, especially in the case of fraud and 
financial crime, rationalisation. Motivations are symbolic constructions that make certain goals 
and activities desirable.39 Opportunities are situations that make criminal behaviours possible, 
such as access to targets/victims, availability of means and the lack of adequate controls.40 
Rationalisation – the third component of Donald Cressey’s famous ‘fraud triangle’41 – is the 
neutralisation of the moral and cognitive dissonances caused by criminal behaviour.42 Remote 
causes are the deeper biological, cultural, socio-psychological, economic and politico-
institutional developments that determine or aggravate criminal motivations or opportunities.43  
For instance, writing about corruption – but the reasoning applies to any financial crime – 
Ashforth and Anand add to rationalisation the mutually reinforcing processes of 
institutionalisation – the embedding and routinising of corrupt practices in organizational 
structures and processes – and socialisation – the inducement of newcomers to view corruption 
as permissible, if not desirable.44 These go beyond specific situations or individuals and are 
rooted in more complex socio-cultural and organisational patterns. Other remote causes are 
prompted by global developments, such as the globalisation of markets and the expansion of 
economic opportunities or the advance and diffusion of new technologies.45 Amongst these, 
the excessive cultural and institutional emphasis on financial success and social prestige and 
the lack of means to achieve them can be particularly significant in the causation of economic 
crime, as suggested by anomie and strain theory in all their variations. Anomie is a situation of 
 
36 ibid. para 5.10. 
37 cf Garland (n 11). 
38 Pasculli ‘The Global Causes of Cybercrime’ (n 17) 51-52.  
39 David Cantor and Kennet C. Land ‘Unemployment and Crime Rates in the Post-World War II United States: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’ (1985) 50 American Sociological Review 317–332.  
40 Lawrence E. Cohen and Marcus Felson ‘Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach’ 
(1979) 44 American Sociological Review 588–608. 
41 Donald R. Cressey Other People’s Money (Wadsworth 1953). 
42 Graham Sykes and David Matza ‘Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency’ (1957) 22(6) American 
Sociological Review 664–670. 
43 Pasculli ‘The Global Causes of Cybercrime’ (n 17). 
44 Blake E. Ashforth and Vikas Anand ‘The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations’ (2003) 25 Research 
in Organizational Behaviour 1 and Vikas Anand, Blake E. Ashforth and Mahendra Joshi ‘Business as Usual: The 
Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption’ (2004) 18(2) Academy of Management Executive 39. 
45 ibid. and Lorenzo Pasculli and Nicholas Ryder ‘Corruption and globalization. Towards an interdisciplinary 
scientific understanding of corruption as a global crime’ in Lorenzo Pasculli and Nicholas Ryder (eds) Corruption 
in the Global Era: Causes, Sources and Forms of Manifestation (Routledge 2019). 
‘normlessness’, in which society fails to regulate the naturally unlimited desires of 
individuals.46 Industrialisation first and then global neoliberalism, with its discourses of 
economic growth, free markets, individualism, consumerism, privatisation and deregulation, 
have created new needs, desires and fashions. But equal legal means to pursue them are still 
unavailable to many.47 Such divergence between means and ends produces a sense of 
deprivation and frustration in those who fail to achieve the globally valued goals of success.48 
With the right opportunities, such strains can not only compromise mental health (anomie’s 
theory was used by Durkheim to explain suicide) but also motivate criminal behaviours and 
especially financial crime.49  
However, removing structural obstacles to legitimate opportunities is not enough to reduce 
crime rates when all the major social institutions primarily support the quest for material 
success and fail to promote alternative definitions of self-worth and achievement.50 Goals must 
be questioned, other than means. This framework is further complicated by the advent of cyber 
technologies which not only provide opportunities and instruments for financial criminality 
and weaken formal and informal controls (proximate causes) but also amplify the reach and 
intensity of material goals of success51. Remote causes do not only operate at a societal level. 
Pioneering studies suggest that there may be significant correlations between crime, including 
financial crime, and biological conditions, often rooted in the way our brain works52. For 
instance, neurosciences support and provide a biological explanation to the criminological idea 
that the perceived lack of victims and short-sighted or impulsive decision-making are often 
behind the commission of financial crimes.53 These studies suggest that a better knowledge of 
our biological processes can usher more humane and cost-effective policies54, such as 
‘prefrontal workout’ and customised rehabilitation of offenders55. Without digging any further 
into the remote causes of fraud and financial crime, it is evident that the combination of 
responsibilisation and law enforcement merely addresses the proximate causes of crime. 
Information-sharing, awareness-raising and risk management, on the one hand, and policing, 
prosecution and sanctions, on the other hand, intervene directly on situational opportunities 
and controls, and, less directly, on immediate criminal motivations and pressures, but do little 
to resolve the deepest social drivers of criminality. These require broader welfare interventions 
 
46 Émile Durkheim Suicide: A Study in Sociology (trs A. Spaulding and George A. Simpson, Routledge 1897, 
2002). 
47 Joseph Stiglitz Globalization and Its Discontents (Norton 2002); Joseph Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (Norton 
2012).  
48 Robert K. Merton ‘Social Structure and Anomie’ (1938) 3(5) American Sociological Review672–682; Robert 
K. Merton Social Theory and Social Structure (Free Press 1968). 
49 Nikos Passas ‘Anomie and Corporate Deviance’ (1990) 14 Contemporary Crises 157–178; Nikos Passas 
‘Global Anomie, Dysnomie, and Economic Crime: Hidden Consequences of Neoliberalism and Globalization in 
Russia and around the World’ (2000) 27(2) Social Justice 16–44. See also Robert Agnew ‘Foundation for a 
General Strain Theory of Delinquency’ (1990) 30 Criminology 47–87; Robert Agnew ‘The Nature and 
Determinants of Strain: Another Look at Durkheim and Merton’ in Nikos Passas and Robert Agnew (eds) The 
Future of Anomie Theory (Northeastern University 1997) 27–51; Robert Agnew Why Do Criminals Offend? A 
General Theory of Crime and Delinquency (Roxbury 2005). 
50 Steven F. Messner and Richard Rosenfeld ‘Markets, Morality, and an Institutional-Anomie Theory of Crime’ 
in Nikos Passas and Robert Agnew (eds) The Future of Anomie Theory (Northeastern University Press 1997) 207–
227 and Steven F. Messner and Richard Rosenfeld Crime and The American Dream (5th edn, Wadsworth 2013).  
51 Pasculli (n 17) 55. 
52 Adrian Raine The Anatomy of Violence. The Biological Roots of Crime (Penguin 2013) 175-180. 
53 cf Eugene Soltes Why They Do It. Inside the Mind of the White-Collar Criminal (Public Affairs 2016) 18-19 
and David Eagleman Incognito. The Secret Lives of the Brain (Canongate 2011) 112 and David Eagleman The 
Brain. The Story of You (Canongate 2015) 118-143. 
54 Eagleman The Brain (n 53) 141. 
55 Eagleman Incognito (n 53) 180-186. 
aimed at levelling social inequalities, promoting education and the physical and mental 
wellbeing of individuals, and an overall reflection on the values promoted by society and its 
institutions. Otherwise, the responsibilisation of civil society will result in the 
deresponsibilisation of the state.56 
Another concern is that the large transfer of crime control responsibilities to private 
organisations – mostly businesses – and the business-like approach to criminal justice entails 
a commodification of security,57 and even of legal prescriptions.58 This can have several 
adverse consequences. Firstly, it might exacerbate anomie by fuelling cultural emphasis on 
market-oriented goals, methods, targets, and institutions. Secondly, the emphasis on 
commercial risk mitigation has created a growing industry which works through logics and 
mechanisms which serve to expand the demand for private security services. The suggestion 
that political responses alone are insufficient and risks can only be effectively contained by 
‘bespoke’ commercial services might contribute to the perpetuation of a culture of risk in which 
the demand for security can never be satisfied and guarantees continuous profits.59 Finally, 
once security becomes a commodity it tends to be distributed by market forces, rather than 
according to need, thus leaving the poorest and least powerful in our societies unprotected.60 
The response of the UK Government to fraud risks during the pandemic: an outline 
The UK approach to Covid19-related fraud risks reflects the dichotomy law enforcement-
responsibilisation. Law enforcement during the pandemic has suffered inevitable limitations. 
The criminal justice system continued to operate, although partially. As of 23 June 2020, 93 
courts were still not open to the public.61 The CPS has prioritised the prosecution of all COVID-
19-related cases62, including fraud and dishonesty offences against vulnerable victims and the 
SFO is continuing its investigations.63 This prioritisation should ensure that, despite the 
constraints of the current circumstances, resources are allocated to the investigation and 
prosecution of COVID-19-related fraud.  
As for responsibilisation, our review suggests us to distinguish between measures adopted in 
the private sector and measures adopted in the public sector. Private sector responsibilisation 
targets mainly individual citizens and businesses. Public sector responsibilisation addresses 
leaders and fraud experts in government bodies and local authorities that are administering 
emergency programmes on behalf of the Government.64 Some responsibilisation measures are 
 
56 Pasculli (n 17) 62–65. 
57 cf Garland (n 11) 463 and Elke Krahmann ‘Security: Collective Good or Commodity?’ (2008) 14(3) European 
Journal of International Relations 379-404. 
58 Shamir (n 26) 2, citing Orly Lobel ‘The renew deal: The fall of regulation and the rise of governance in 
contemporary legal thought’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342. 
59 Elke Krahmann ‘Beck and Beyond: Selling Security in the World Risk Society’ (2011) 37(1) Review of 
International Studies 349-372. 
60 Garland (n 11) 463. 
61 From 17 July 2020, the government is no longer publishing the tracker list as most courts and tribunals buildings 
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common to both private and public sectors. These are awareness-raising and information 
campaigns – mostly online – to help citizens, businesses and potential victims and are 
encouraged to take any precaution to minimise fraud risks. The central Government website 
(gov.uk) has published various webpages to COVID-19-related anti-fraud advice for 
individuals,65 businesses,66 charities,67 and public bodies.68 In addition, various government 
agencies, such as the CPS and NCA,69 the FCA,70 the NHS,71 NTS,72 the NCSC,73 The Pensions 
Regulator,74 Action Fraud,75 and Take Five76 have published their own online advice, often 
articulated in different webpages. County and city councils have also introduced online 
guidance against fraud.  
In addition to such campaigns, more specific action target private organisations and public 
bodies. As for private bodies, various government agencies and regulators have made available 
specific tools to support businesses in implementing adequate precautions and internal controls 
to prevent them or their employees from becoming victims of fraud or to commit fraud. The 
NCSC, for instance, published a clear and well-structured Guidance on Home Working77 which 
includes links to many helpful practical tools, such as a clear infographic78 and further 
guidance. The FCA’s webpage ‘Avoid coronavirus scam’79 is also effective: short and well 
organised, it contains specific guidance on different fraud schemes with links to helpful tools 
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79 FCA (n 70). 
such as the Financial Services Register,80 the FCA Warning List,81 and ScamSmart.82 Most of 
these tools support and complement the implementation of crime control duties and 
responsibilities imposed on companies and their executives by pre-existing regulation – so 
there’s nothing innovative about them.  
The responsibilisation of the public sector has been more creative. To help the public sector 
understand its fraud risks – especially those generated by stimulus spending – and design 
adequate countermeasures, the Cabinet Office’s centre of the Counter Fraud Function has 
established the Covid-19 Counter Fraud Response Team (CCFRT). The team is proactively 
monitoring the Covid-19 fraud threat utilising expertise, intelligence and analytics from its 
partnerships with law enforcement, the public sector, the private sector and our international 
relationships with the Five-Eyes countries. It is combining this intelligence with expert fraud 
risk assessment of the stimulus spending to help the public sector understand its fraud risks and 
to design and develop countermeasures, alerts and guidance. By doing this, the CCFRT aims 
at making the funding go further and support more of the community through the pandemic. 
Once again, the focus is on risk assessment, but, interestingly, the CCFRT is applying the risk-
based approach to policy design and delivery. 
The limits of the two-fold responsibilisation-law enforcement approach 
Our comparative review exposes many failings in the Government’s response to Covid-19-
related fraud risks. On a more superficial level, many practical flaws that can hinder crime 
control activities, both from civil society and from state law enforces – these include, for 
instance, excessive fragmentation and poor coordination between different measures, 
confusing or inaccessible advice or limited enforcement capabilities.  These mostly depend on 
how the responsibilisation-law enforcement strategies have been implemented by the 
Government. On a deeper level, the limits of the Government’s overall approach can have a 
more substantial and long-lasting impact on society, by failing to address the root causes of 
crime and even by aggravating criminogenic conditions. These seem to be more intrinsic flaws 
of the developments in crime control analysed above. Below we will illustrate these 
shortcomings with the support of the findings of our review. 
Law enforcement 
Apart from the above-mentioned court closures and limited police and prosecution capabilities 
during the pandemic, a major obstacle to effective prosecution is that there are too many 
reporting channels. These include Action Fraud’s hotline and online reporting tool,83 Citizens 
Advice’s channels, the NCSC’s email address report@phishing.gov.uk, FCA’s Consumer 
Helpline,84 or online reporting form,85 the SFO’s online reporting form,86 HMRC’s various 
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reporting channels,87 plus the long and confusing list of prescribed entities for 
whistleblowing.88 This makes it difficult for certain groups of citizens, particularly the most 
vulnerable ones – such as the elderly, or those with limited access to or experience of the 
Internet – to identify the right reporting channel. Reporting to the wrong channel requires to 
spend additional time and resources to redirect the victim towards the appropriate channel and 
can cause delays in investigations.  Moreover, some of these channels are providing a reduced 
service. From June 2020 until the time at which we’re writing (December 2020), Action 
Fraud’s website has been warning that ‘Due to the ongoing COVID-19 situation, unfortunately, 
our contact centre is currently providing a reduced service. If you do need to chat to us, we 
have a small number of advisors on hand to help but please be advised that waiting times will 
be longer. We apologise for any inconvenience caused. If your UK business, charity or 
organisation is currently under cyber-attack and data is potentially at risk please call 0300 123 
2040 immediately and press 9. You can continue to make reports of fraud in the normal way 
via the website.’ There are many problems with such a message. First, it can encourage fraud. 
Second, it can discourage reporting. Third, it creates a perception of inequality between 
individuals and organisations, reflecting the assumption that the interests of business are valued 
more than those of citizens. As a result, it can foster anomie, frustration and social mistrust. 
Regulators also struggle to cope with their law enforcement duties, particularly in response to 
stimulus fraud. HMRC is responsible for investigating cases of irregular CJRS and Self-
Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) payments and can audit retrospectively any 
claim89. To facilitate this, HMRC set up an online form for the reporting of HMRC-
administered coronavirus (COVID-19) relief scheme fraud,90 and urged anyone concerned that 
their employer might be abusing the scheme to report them.91 More recently, facing increasing 
numbers of reports (almost 1900 as of 29 May 2020),92 the Finance Act 2020 gives HMRC 
new powers to recover irregular payments and impose penalties for those who make 
deliberately incorrect claims and fail to notify the HMRC within the prescribed terms. 
Unfortunately, HMRC lacks the capacity for random audits. The sheer volume of demands 
attracted by Scheme,93 together with the capacity constraints created by its implementation,94 
makes effective and extensive preventive auditing improbable and costly, meaning that most 
investigation will have to be retrospective.95 The model also places excessive reliance on 
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employee reporting. Despite the number of reports received by HMRC so far, researchers 
suggest that many cases could go unreported due to the many barriers to individual reporting.96 
Furloughed employees might feel ‘blackmailed into working’ and fear to lose their job by not 
doing so,97 or by reporting the company. Even if anonymity was assured, employers might 
refrain from reporting for fear that the withdrawal of government funding or the imposition of 
sanctions might put the company out of business,98 or force it to stop paying their colleagues.99 
Finally, there is insufficient psychological and personal support for those who wish to report. 
The above-mentioned barriers can affect the mental wellbeing of employees. HMRC 
encourages reporting, but there is no evidence of any special care measures to support 
employees victimised by furlough frauds or those who have reported their employees. 
Responsibilisation of the private sector 
The information and guidance published are far from ideal, especially for private citizens. They 
are highly fragmentary, scattered as they are throughout the Internet. We have counted at least 
20 webpages from national agencies, without considering the further advice published by most 
county councils, city councils and police forces. While a certain level of diversification is 
required to address different fraud risks and different sectors, the fragmentariness of guidance 
from government bodies at all levels is excessive and can compromise its effectiveness in many 
ways. The unnecessary multiplication and complexity of online sources make any relevant 
information difficult to access and understand. Even expert researchers would struggle to 
identify all the relevant sources and reconstruct a coherent set of messages. Moreover, the 
choice of the Internet as the primary (if not exclusive) means of information is debatable, as 
not everyone, and especially vulnerable groups, can easily access it or use it properly. We could 
find no evidence of information campaigns launched through other media (press, television 
and radio). Such piecemeal advice is not only difficult to access, but it is also confusing and 
contradictory as its various sources are not appropriately coordinated. The information 
provided differs from one website to another, and so does its format. Some websites are very 
specific, others are more generic. Many sources do not follow the general ‘Stop, Challenge and 
Protect’ approach adopted by the Government in the gov.uk and Action Fraud websites.100 The 
Cambridgeshire County Council webpage101 even refers citizens to the website Which?,102 
which is not backed or checked by the Government and offers commercial products and 
services. Moreover, different sources suggest different reporting channels. The Suffolk County 
council website,103 for instance, does not advise citizens to report fraud cases to Action Fraud, 
but only to call National Citizen’s Advice helpline. Moreover, some of the online advice is 
incomplete and out of date. Some gov.uk webpages are months old and date back to spring 
2020,104 despite a second lockdown was called in November. Other online guidance does not 
cover some important fraud risks. None of the main anti-fraud agencies or relevant government 
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bodies has published informative videos on COVID-19-related fraud risks and some of the 
videos currently available are years old. The latest video uploaded on YouTube by Action 
Fraud dates back to August 2019,105 while the latest video uploaded by Financial Fraud Action 
UK dates back to February 2018.106 Some websites include broken links to other webpages: 
from June to November 2020 the Staffordshire County council website,107 for instance, referred 
to a wrong link to Take Five’s advice.108 The NHS’s COVID-19 counter fraud guidance109 is 
mostly addressed to NHS staff, rather than the general public and it does not mention the risks 
of fraud related to the ‘Test and Trace’ system flagged by the Local Government 
Association.110 Such risks are briefly mentioned in the general ‘Test and Trace’ webpage111 but 
no extensive advice is provided. Similarly, we could not find any official guidance on the 
recently uncovered scam designed to steal personal and financial details of millions of self-
employed workers using the SEISS.112  
As we mentioned above, the guidance for business appears to be overall more impactful. 
However, the FCA published an ambiguous message on its website concerning the controls 
that companies are expected to adopt during the coronavirus crisis.113 While the FAC clearly 
states that ‘firms should not seek to address operational issues by changing their risk appetite’, 
it also recognises that ‘firms may need to re-prioritise or reasonably delay some activities’, 
including ‘customer due diligence reviews, or reviews of transaction monitoring alerts’. This 
would be considered ‘reasonable’ by FCA as long as ‘the firm does so on a risk basis’ (e.g. not 
for high-risk activities, such as terrorist financing) and plans to return to the business as usual 
review process as soon as possible. The ambiguous wording leaves firms a considerable 
discretion to determine what activities are ‘low’ and ‘high’ risk and can encourage relaxation 
of controls on risks of criminal offences, such as many fraudulent schemes, that might not be 
as ‘high’ as terrorist financing, but can still cause considerable harm to private customers and 
vulnerable individuals. 
Responsibilisation of the public sector 
The risk-based approach adopted by CCFRT is promising and welcome. Research from various 
disciplines suggests that policy and regulation can inadvertently create or increase risks of 
crime,114 by unintendedly providing opportunities for criminal schemes or strengthening 
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criminal motivations or otherwise aggravating other criminogenic factors.115 Stimulus 
programmes such as the CJRS and SEISS are excellent examples of policies having legitimate 
purposes which also create the risk of fraudulent exploitation.116 To mitigate the unintended 
criminogenic effects of regulation, researchers have suggested regulatory risk assessment 
mechanisms to evaluate and mitigate any crime risks entailed by any proposed regulation (so-
called ‘crime proofing’).117 A similar risk-based approach has been adopted to proof legislation 
against corruption risks throughout Eastern Europe.118  
Recent studies recommend an even broader approach targeting not only written regulation but 
also policymaking and administrative and judicial decision-making and including appropriate 
training and capacity-building for lawmakers and policymakers at large.119 The approach 
adopted by the CCFRT seems to go precisely in this direction: the CCFRT helps leaders and 
policymakers to understand and assess fraud risks related to the stimulus policies and helping 
public bodies design and deliver adequate countermeasures. Nevertheless, there are various 
shortcomings. The first concern a lack of transparency and accountability. It is very difficult to 
assess the CCFRT’s work as few sources about it are publicly available. The CCFRT does not 
have a dedicated webpage and the only information accessible online is included in a handful 
PDF documents scattered in various random websites (e.g. gov.uk,120 NHS websites.121 the 
British Vehicle Rental & Leasing Association (BVRLA)'s website).122 One of these documents 
claims that the CCFRT ‘have built an expert team who can provide a variety of expertise’,123 
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the Tobacco Products Directive (Transcrime, Università degli Studi di Trento 2012); Stefano Caneppele, Ernesto 
U. Savona and Alberto Aziani Crime Proofing of the New Tobacco Products Directive (Transcrime, Università 
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accessed 4 December 2020. 
122 Government Counter Fraud Function ‘COVID-19 Mandate Fraud’ (bvrla.co.uk 2020) < 
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123 Government Counter Fraud Function (n 121). 
but there is no indication of who these experts are, what their background is and how they were 
appointed. The first issue of a newsletter (April 2020) can be found in the MIAA/NHS 
website,124 but there is no trace of further issues. The lack of transparent information prevents 
full, impartial scrutiny by independent experts, relevant stakeholders and the general public, 
reduces the opportunities for improvement and prevents the dissemination of good practices 
beyond the public sector. A second problem concerns the limited scope of the CCFRT’s work. 
This focuses especially on protecting public money, rather than protecting businesses and 
individuals. The Counter Fraud Measures Toolkit, released by the CCFRT,125  suggests various 
due diligence measures, such as identity and account verification, to avoid irregular payments, 
but fails to address the risk that scammers exploit support schemes to try to steal money from 
people;126 as it happened in a case of scam designed to steal personal and financial details of 
millions of self-employed workers through fake HMRC text messages and website.127 
Moreover, the CCFRT focuses primarily on stimulus spending, but crime and fraud risks can 
be triggered by many other types of government policies and schemes.  
There is also a lack of ex post evaluation. The measures to assess and control fraud risks 
suggested by the Counter Fraud Measures Toolkit cover only the phases of policy design and 
implementation. A systematic mechanism to assess the crime and fraud risks triggered by 
government policies after their termination is still missing. Ex post assessments are 
fundamental to learn from past mistakes and avoid repeating them – that is, to become 
acquainted with risks that had not been anticipated in the design and implementation of a policy 
and be able to address them in future policymaking128. The CCFRT’s engagement with foreign 
and international institutions is also limited. The Team claims to use ‘intelligence and 
analytics’ from partnerships with Five Eyes countries. These are the members of the Five Eyes 
Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC)129 and the International Public Sector 
Fraud Forum (IPSFF);130 the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA. It is unclear 
why the CCFRT should limit its international partnerships to such countries. Surely 
intelligence from other (and closer) jurisdictions, such as European states, and international 
organisations, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), is equally important. 
Furthermore, although the CCFRT claims to use intelligence from partnerships with the public 
and private sectors, there is no evidence of engagement with scientific research and academia. 
The CCFRT’s Counter Fraud Measures Toolkit does not rely on the findings of previous 
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research on crime risk assessment of policy and regulation. Instead, it is largely based on 
IPSFF’s Principles for Effective Fraud Control in Emergency Management and Recovery,131 – 
which does not refer to academic literature at all. There is no evidence of any involvement of 
academics in the work of the CCFRT. Perhaps, some of the above shortcomings could have 
been avoided by preventatively consulting academic experts.  
The offender vanishes 
The greatest failure of the above-mentioned government strategies is the lack of efforts to 
mitigate criminal motivations or the remote causes of fraud. While there is a commitment to 
prevent victimisation through awareness-raising and risk management (responsibilisation) and 
to dissuade offenders through the threat of traditional law enforcement, there is no trace of any 
commitment to a serious understanding of the cultural, social, economic and psychological 
conditions that can trigger or aggravate individual motivations to commit fraud during the 
pandemic. Nor can we assume that such commitment is included in the overall government 
strategy against financial crime. The Economic Crime Plan 2019-2022 does not include any 
action or strategic priority aimed at understanding and assessing any such development. 
‘Understanding the threat’ merely refers to the identification and assessment of situational 
risks. Crime prevention is thus reduced to prevention of victimisation, situational prevention 
and deterrence, with the exclusion of any broader or deeper social intervention. This is a clear, 
albeit perhaps unnecessary, confirmation of Garland’s suggestion that the rehabilitative ideal 
is indeed in decline.132 The offender, with their issues, needs and reasons (or lack thereof), 
disappears in the thousand pieces of advice for potential victims and micro-activities to 
securitise things, practices and situations. It might also be a product of an implicit assumption, 
based on the level of sophistication of certain fraudulent schemes, fraudsters and financial 
criminals are relatively educated and socially integrated. This assumption might be true for 
fraudulent schemes at the expenses of stimulus programmes, as much as for other high-profile 
frauds, but it does not imply that even such offences can be motivated by a criminogenic mix 
of individual strains (financial, biological, psychological etc.) and social developments. Indeed, 
the pandemic has aggravated some of the factors, such as social and economic inequality,133 
which, more than destitution itself, can cause psychological pressures that can drive individuals 
to crime,134 especially of financial nature.  
One could argue that addressing the root causes of fraud and financial crime requires time and 
the temporariness and urgency of the pandemic does not allow for planning and implementing 
broader and long-standing social programmes, such as education or mental care, which should 
instead be pursued by other policy areas not necessarily related to crime. But, in fact, not all 
root causes require sophisticated and long-lasting initiatives, as we shall see in the next 
paragraph. Nor can the complexity of the causes of crime or the challenges of studying them 
be a valid excuse for inaction. As we saw, social sciences and even natural sciences already 
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provide important indications for policy and more investment on and engagement with 
academic research can help identify specific objectives and actions.  
Recommendations 
We suggest the following measures to remedy the above shortcomings.  
Guidance and information 
Any information, guidance and advice on COVID-19-related fraud risk issued by national and 
local government agencies should be coordinated and accessible through one comprehensive 
and constantly updated online portal to avoid unnecessary repetitions, confusion and 
multiplication of sources. A good example of a similar portal is provided by the centralised 
coronavirus information website published by the USA.135 Advice which is applicable across 
the country and any sector should be given by the central Government through the above portal, 
which should, in turn, refer to the website of other entities (e.g. local councils, sectorial 
regulators or organisations) for specific advice relevant to particular geographical or policy 
areas. Information and guidance should not only be provided online but also through extensive 
campaigns via more traditional media, such as newspapers, radio and television, to the benefit 
of the elderly and other groups who might be unable to access the Internet. Governmental 
agencies and regulators should refrain from publishing ambiguous messages that can 
inadvertently discourage reporting, encourage relaxation of corporate crime controls or fuel 
criminal motivations. Public communication campaigns should focus not only on potential 
victims but also on potential offenders, with a view to reducing criminal motivations and 
criminogenic mindsets and discourses, as we will explain more in detail in the last paragraph 
of this section. 
Reporting channels 
Reporting channels should be rationalised. There should be a central national online portal for 
those who wish to report any kind of financial crime. The portal could include a preliminary 
questionnaire relying on AI to direct the applicant to the appropriate authority according to the 
type of fraud to be reported (Action Fraud, HMRC, FCA, SFO etc.). This centralised system 
could be used also to receive reports of misconduct from whistle-blowers. A similar, although 
pretty basic, online questionnaire is incorporated in the SFO website.136 A national whistle-
blowers authority should be established to coordinate, advice and supervise prescribed entities, 
act (at least) as last-resort reporting channel when other channels prove ineffective and advice 
and support whistle-blowers. The United States’ (US) Office of the Whistleblower, the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority are good examples of such institutions.  
Policy risk management  
The work of the CCFRT should be better publicised, possibly through a dedicated website and 
by making any relevant policy document (newsletter, toolkits etc.) released by the Team 
publicly available online to allow thorough public scrutiny and continuous improvement 
through external feedback. The focus of the CCFRT should be expanded to cover not only risks 
of irregular payments of public money but, more broadly, any risk of criminal harm caused to 
the public sector, as well as to private individuals and organisations, by frauds related to any 
other government policy/scheme. Ex post risk assessment mechanisms should be introduced to 
understand the risks created by government policies that could not be foreseen during the 
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design and implementation stages. The work of the CCFRT should benefit from a broader 
international partnership (beyond the Five-Eyes) and continuous engagement with academia. 
The Government could also consider establishing (or developing the CCFRT into) a national 
coordinating authority dedicated to improving the detection, prevention, investigation, and 
prosecution of criminal conduct related to natural and man-made disasters and other 
emergencies, such as the coronavirus, similar to the US National Centre for Disaster Fraud 
(NCDF)137. Given that any government policy and regulation in any area can inadvertently 
create/increase risks not only of fraud but of any other crime, the Government should take 
advantage of the experience of the CCFRT to start establishing permanent mechanisms to 
perform a thorough crime risk assessment of any policy and regulation before and after their 
adoption and to adopt appropriate measures to control such risks.  
Tackling the root causes of financial crime 
The UK Government’s approach to fraud and economic crime should address all the possible 
causes of crime, not just opportunities. The two-fold approach responsibilisation-law 
enforcement should be integrated with a third component dedicated to the identification, 
understanding and mitigation of remote causes of financial crime. This requires both short-
term and long-term interventions. On the short term, solid communication campaigns can be 
used to counter the anomic focus on financial success and social prestige with messages 
promoting notions of self-worth and self-achievement based on human dignity, integrity, 
honesty, and solidarity. Public communication can also be helpful to remind potential offenders 
that support is available to them and that there are alternatives to crime. But this support cannot 
be merely financial. As we saw above, stimulus programmes alone can be an opportunity for 
fraud, as much as an opportunity for legitimate financial recovery. Clear and continuing 
information on the importance of mental wellbeing should and on the availability, even during 
the pandemic, of free and accessible care is essential. At a socio-psychological level, more 
efforts are required to counter the processes of rationalisation, socialisation and 
institutionalisation of fraud. Communication, information, education and training can be 
employed to counter the opportunistic and profit-oriented mind sets that both facilitate and are 
fuelled by such normalisation processes. On the longer term, the Government should take stock 
of the lessons learned during the pandemic about the fragility of our socio-economic system 
and the dangers of overemphasising business-like approaches and financial interests. The 
Government should conduct a thorough assessment of the failures of current social policies 
and start planning appropriate welfare measures to address the deepest criminogenic conditions 
of the British society, such as social inequality, lack of integration, the cognitive distortions 
caused by an excessive emphasis on economic life and interests, and the social distortions 
caused by the commodification of essential services and values – not only in crime control but 
also in other areas, such as, for instance, education. Research is also paramount. Mechanisms 
and platforms for better integration of policy and academia should be established and the 
Government should invest more in interdisciplinary scientific research on the remote causes of 
crime.   
Conclusions 
The coronavirus pandemic has exposed the limits of the UK Government’s approach to fraud, 
financial crime and crime in general, confirming the worries and predictions of many scholars. 
Such limits go beyond practical or situational shortcomings, such as the inevitable restrictions 
to law enforcement capabilities imposed by the pandemic or by poor policy design and 
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implementation. Instead, they are rooted in the inherent insufficiency of the two-fold approach 
responsibilisation-law enforcement approach to effectively and comprehensively address the 
problem of crime, especially easily normalised forms of crime such as fraud and especially in 
times of crisis. Strained law enforcement agencies and regulators struggle to cope with the high 
numbers of reported frauds. As a result, both deterrence and retribution are undermined. On 
the other hand, the fixation on the surgical identification, dissection and rectification of a 
myriad of micro-situations that can entail a risk of crime is both illusory and deceiving. For as 
the state keeps his eyes focused on this or that situation, he loses sight of the greatest risk factor: 
human beings, with their complex and delicate histories, biologies, psychologies, and social 
interactions.  
If the state hopes to effectively prevent fraud and financial crime, it must go back to the 
offender. The approach to crime control should be three-fold. Law enforcement and 
responsibilisation must be complemented by the identification and removal of the remote 
causes of crime. This is especially important for fraud and financial crime, which often defy 
traditional criminological theories and require more research and new approaches. Common 
places and assumptions on the motivations of fraudsters and financial criminals must be 
challenged through engagement with the scientific community. ‘Understanding the threat’ 
must acquire a new meaning. Not only understanding situational risks and opportunities but 
especially understanding motivations and deeper social, cultural, psychological and even 
biological developments that drive financial crime. Forgetting the offender is never a good 
idea. 
